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The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation 
Act: Potential Problems in the Biologic-Drug 
Regulatory Scheme 
By Ryan Timmis* 
In 2010, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, often referred 
to as “Obamacare.”  Though little noticed in the fanfare surrounding this event, Title VII, 
the Biologic Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA), was arguably one of the most 
important provisions.  The BPCIA represents one of the more significant overhauls to the 
pharmaceutical industry in recent decades. For the first time, federal law established a 
pathway for the creation of generic versions of drugs produced by biotechnological means.  
Congress hoped by legalizing the production of generic biological drugs, generally known 
as “biosimilars,” that consumer prices for a variety of important drugs would decrease.  
In 1983, the Hatch-Waxman Act created a pathway to market for generic versions of 
traditional small-molecule drugs.  Small-molecule drugs, which comprise the majority of 
commonly used drugs, are created by purely chemical processes and have relatively simple 
structures. As Congress hoped, Hatch-Waxman has had considerable success in lessening 
the cost of many pharmaceuticals. For instance, a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) study 
found that the entry of multiple generics into the market under the Hatch-Waxman Act 
reduced the price of some drugs by up to 80%.   
But consumers are unlikely to see comparable biosimilar price reductions resulting from 
the BPCIA’s enactment.  First, biologic drugs are inherently more difficult and costly to 
manufacture than traditional pharmaceuticals, providing barriers to entry that the BPCIA 
cannot effectively address. Second, compared to Hatch-Waxman, the BPCIA imposes much 
longer exclusivity periods for both reference drugs and the first biosimilar produced. This 
will, at a minimum, delay the cost benefits stemming from increased competition. Lastly, 
the interchangeability provisions, which allow for automatic substitution of reference 
products similar to generic chemical drugs under Hatch-Waxman, are much stricter for 
biologics regulated under the BPCIA. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1  In 2010, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, often 
referred to as “Obamacare.”1 Though little noticed in the fanfare surrounding this event, 
Title VII, the Biologic Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA), was arguably one 
of the most important provisions.2 The BPCIA represents one of the more significant 
overhauls to the pharmaceutical industry in recent decades. For the first time, federal law 
established a pathway for the creation of generic versions of drugs produced by 
biotechnological means.3 Congress hoped by legalizing the production of generic 
biological drugs, generally known as “biosimilars,” that consumer prices for a variety of 
important drugs would decrease.4 
¶2  Modern biotechnology drugs, or “biologics,” have been a major part of the U.S. drug 
market since the Federal Drug Administration (FDA) approved the use of human insulin 
in 1982.5 Biologic drugs are expected to gain an even larger share of the U.S. economy 
with time.6 They already include many of the most commonly used drugs in America, 
including four of the top ten most common drugs sold.7 Approximately 20% of all drugs 
on the market in 2009 were biologics.8 
 
1 Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, Obama Signs Heath Care Overhaul Bill, with a Flourish, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 23, 2010, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/health/policy/24health. 
html?_r=0. 
2 JUDITH JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34045, FDA REGULATION OF FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS 
12 (2010), available at http://primaryimmune.org/advocacy_center/pdfs/health_care_reform/ 
Biosimilars_Congressional_Research_Service_Report. 
3 Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Protection of Trade Secrets and Patents Under the Biologics 
Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 285, 286 (2011). 
4 See Letter from Rep. Anna Eshoo et al. to President Barack Obama (Oct. 14, 2011), available at 
http://patentdocs.typepad.com/files/house-letter.pdf. 
5 See JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 1. 
6 Id. 
7 Biologic drugs sold under the brand names Humira, Enbrel, Remicade and Neulasta are the third, 
seventh, eighth, and ninth most prescribed drugs in the United States, respectively, as of the third quarter of 
2013. In addition, the tenth most sold drug, Copaxone, though approved under a New Drug Application per 
the FDCA, is a protein-based drug with characteristics strongly similar to biologics. See U.S. 
Pharmaceutical Sales: Q4 2013, DRUGS.COM, http://www.drugs.com/stats/top100/sales (last visited Jan. 
29, 2013). 
8 WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33901, FOLLOW-ON 
BIOLOGICS: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INNOVATION ISSUES 1 (2009), available at 
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33901_20090803.pdf. 
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¶3  However, prices for commonly used biologics are often prohibitive. For instance, the 
Crohn’s disease drug Humira—the most commonly sold biologic drug in the United 
States9—costs patients $51,000 on average annually.10 Other biologics cost even more, 
sometimes reaching six figures.11 Consequently, insurers adopted numerous strategies to 
pass costs on to consumers, potentially locking out the less fortunate.12 It was against this 
background that Congress passed the BPCIA. 
¶4  In 1983, the Hatch-Waxman Act created a pathway to market for generic versions of 
traditional small-molecule drugs.13 Small-molecule drugs, which comprise the majority of 
commonly used drugs, are created by purely chemical processes and have relatively simple 
structures. As Congress hoped, Hatch-Waxman has had considerable success in lessening 
the cost of many pharmaceuticals. For instance, a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) study 
found that the entry of multiple generics into the market under the Hatch-Waxman Act 
reduced the price of some drugs by up to 80%.14  
¶5  But consumers are unlikely to see comparable biosimilar price reductions resulting 
from the BPCIA’s enactment for various reasons.15 First, biologic drugs are inherently 
more difficult and costly to manufacture than traditional pharmaceuticals, providing 
barriers to entry that the BPCIA cannot effectively address. Second, compared to Hatch-
Waxman, the BPCIA imposes much longer exclusivity periods for both reference drugs 
and the first biosimilar produced. This will, at a minimum, delay the cost benefits stemming 
from increased competition. Lastly, the interchangeability provisions, which allow for 
automatic substitution of reference products similar to generic chemical drugs under Hatch-
Waxman, are much stricter for biologics regulated under the BPCIA. 
¶6  Part II of this Comment provides an overview of both the regulation of biologics in 
general and the BPCIA in particular. Although biologic and pharmaceutical drugs have 
traditionally been regulated under different statutes, the Hatch-Waxman Act only amended 
the statute regulating pharmaceuticals. Consequently, until the passage of the BPCIA, no 
pathway existed for approving biosimilars of most biologic drugs. 
¶7  Part III analyzes the BPCIA’s likely minimal impact on biologic drug prices. There 
are numerous structural impediments in the production of biosimilars that do not exist for 
generics, of which regulation cannot easily fix. Moreover, specific provisions of the BPCIA 
will not only greatly delay market entry, but also reduce the ability of biosimilars to gain 
market share relative to generics. Part IV concludes by examining the BPCIA’s potential 
impact on future innovation. 
 
9 Id. 
10 See JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 1. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 2. 
13 Id. at 1. 
14 FED. TRADE COMM’N, EMERGING HEALTH CARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC DRUG COMPETITION 
12 (2009) (hereinafter FTC Report), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/emerging-health-care-issues-
follow-biologic-drug-competition-federal-trade-commission-report. 
15 See infra Part III for more explanation. 




A. Overview of the History and Regulation of Biologic Drugs 
¶8  The FDA defines biologic drugs as those derived from biological processes and used 
therapeutically to treat diseases.16 This definition is extraordinarily broad, covering 
products ranging from blood components, to toxins like Botox, to viruses altered for use in 
gene therapy.17 Federal regulations differentiate between biologic drugs and chemical 
drugs, which are created by synthetic chemical processes.18 While the latter are regulated 
under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), biologic drugs are, for the most part, 
licensed for marketing under the Public Health Service Act of 1944 (PHSA).19 Amended 
by the FDA Modernization Act of 1997 to simplify the licensing process, the PHSA now 
requires the submission of only a single biologic-license application to market a biologic 
product, replacing the two-license system that had been in place.20 A notable exception to 
the general rule that chemical drugs are regulated under the FDCA while biologics are 
regulated under the PHSA is the regulation of insulin.21 Used primarily to treat diabetes,22 
insulin is a small protein that, along with glucagon, regulates blood-sugar levels and 
carbohydrate metabolism.23   
¶9  In 1921, Frederick Banting and Charles Best were the first to isolate insulin, 
extracting it from the pancreases of dogs in their lab at the University of Toronto.24 Shortly 
thereafter, the insulin extract was used to treat Leonard Thomson, a 14-year-old boy dying 
from type-1 diabetes.25 Though the initial treatment failed due to insufficient purity, a 
subsequent insulin injection was successful, returning the boy to health.26 For his work in 
providing the first effective treatment to a condition that had previously been a death 
 
16 FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., WHAT ARE “BIOLOGICS”: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (Apr. 14, 2009), 
available at http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsand 
Tobacco/CBER/ucm133077.htm. 
17 See 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(1) (2012) (“[Biologics are] a virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, 
vaccine, blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic product, protein (except any chemically 
synthesized polypeptide), or analogous product, or arsphenamine or derivative of arsphenamine (or any 
other trivalent organic arsenic compound), applicable to the prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or 
condition of human beings.”).  
18 JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 1. 
19 Id. at 5. 
20 Id. at 6. 
21 Id. 
22 Insulin is especially critical for treating individuals suffering from type-1 diabetes. Type 1 diabetes is 
an autoimmune disorder affecting the pancreatic islet cells that produce insulin. The beta cells are 
destroyed, resulting in lower insulin levels and higher blood sugar. Type-2 diabetes, by contrast, is caused 
by insulin resistance; the body still produces insulin at normal levels, but the cells that would normally be 
affected by it do so at a reduced level. See Type 1 diabetes, MAYO FOUND. FOR MED. EDUC. AND RESEARCH 
(Aug. 2, 2014), http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/type-1-diabetes/basics/causes/con-
20019573. 
23 Proteins are large organic molecules composed of amino acids with distinct structure. The protein 
insulin is composed of 51 amino acids in two chains, though the specific structure differs somewhat 
between species. See Jean-Philippe Cartailler, The Structure of Insulin, BETA CELL BIOLOGY CONSORTIUM, 
http://www.betacell.org/content/articleview/article_id/8/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2015).  
24 Suzanne White Junod, Celebrating a Milestone: FDA’s Approval of First Genetically Engineered 
Product, UPDATE MAG. (2007), available at http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/ 
ProductRegulation/SelectionsFromFDLIUpdateSeriesonFDAHistory/ucm081964.htm. 
25 KALAYYA KRISHNAMURTHY, PIONEERS IN SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERIES 266 (Mittal Publ’ns 2002). 
26 Michael Bliss, Rewriting History: Charles Best and the Banting and Best Myth, 48 J. HIST. MED. 
ALLIED SCI. 253, 254 (1993), available at http://jhmas.oxfordjournals.org/content/48/3/253.full.pdf.  
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sentence, Charles Banting received the 1923 Nobel Prize in Medicine along with J.J.R. 
Macleod, the director of the lab in which Messrs. Banting and Best worked.27 
¶10  The University of Toronto maintained the patent on insulin until it expired in 1941.28 
During this time, the University of Toronto tested every batch of insulin sold in the United 
States to ensure quality.29 But with the patent’s expiration looming, Congress worried that 
without the university’s standardization and oversight the lives of diabetics and other 
insulin-dependent patients would be “immediately endangered.”30 Congress therefore 
passed the so-called Insulin Amendments to the FDCA two days before the patent expired, 
requiring the FDA to ensure the safety and effectiveness of each batch of insulin sold in 
the United States.31 When Congress passed the PHSA three years later, the FDA retained 
its authority to regulate insulin under the FDCA. 
¶11  Modern biologic-drug technology has advanced significantly since the days of 
animal pancreatic extracts. In 1982, the FDA approved the first modern biotech drug, 
human insulin—or “Humulin,” as marketed by Eli Lilly.32 Rather than rely on purification 
of insulin derived from animals, researchers at Genentech—a small biotechnology firm—
used recombinant DNA technology to make a protein identical to insulin produced by the 
human pancreas.33  
¶12  Recombinant DNA is made by placing a designed nucleic acid sequence, known as 
an “intron,” into a portion of DNA.34 The portion of DNA is referred to as a “cloning 
vector,” and is generally either a plasmid or a DNA-based virus, such as bacteriophage 
lambda.35 One of the key aspects of the cloning vector is that it must be capable of 
independently reproducing inside of a host cell, such as an E. coli bacterium.36 Typically, 
the DNA segment is introduced to the vector by first using a “restriction enzyme” to break 
apart both the original DNA strand and the introduced strand at a specific point in the 
sequence, allowing the two to combine.37 The enzyme DNA-ligase then seals the strands 
together, causing the recombinant DNA to be treated as if it were part of the vector’s DNA 
from the start.38 As a result, the host-cell produces amino acids introduced by the DNA 
codes alongside the normally produced amino acids, creating the desired protein in a 
process known as “translation.”39 The cell will produce the protein indefinitely, and the 
protein can then be isolated and used as a drug in humans.40 
 
27 Id. at 253; see also Louis Rosenfeld, Insulin: Discovery and Controversy, 48 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY 
2270 (2002) (describing Macleod’s contributions). 
28 David M. Dudzinski, Reflections on Historical, Scientific, and Legal Issues Relevant to Designing 
Approval Pathways for Generic Versions of Recombinant Protein-Based Therapeutics and Monoclonal 




32 White Junod, supra note 24. 
33 Dudzinski, supra note 28, at 165. Animal insulin is similar, but not identical, to human insulin. Id.  
34 JEREMY M BERG, JOHN L TYMOCZKO & LUBERT STRYER, BIOCHEMISTRY § 6.2  (5th ed. 2002), 
available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK22480/. 
35 Id. A Plasmid is a piece of DNA generally found in a bacterial host cell that is capable of independent 
replication. Id.  
36 Id. 
37 Id.  
38 Id. 
39 See id. 
40 Id.  
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¶13  Following the introduction of human insulin, the FDA approved human growth 
hormone in 1985, alpha interferon in 1986, tissue plasminogen activator in 1987, and 
erythropoietin in 1989.41 Today, modern biologics represent four of the ten most 
commonly used drugs in the United States by sales.42 As of 2006, eighteen different biotech 
drugs had annual sales of over $1 billion.43  
¶14  Biologic drugs are used to treat a wide array of conditions, including rheumatoid 
arthritis, multiple sclerosis, neutropenia, various types of cancer, and diabetes. Due to the 
“constructed” nature of drugs produced by biotechnological processes, it is possible to 
make blockbuster drugs tailored uniquely to previously unmet medical needs.44 In time, it 
may even be possible to modify a drug for a specific individual.45 Thus, unlike the 
traditional model for pharmacological drugs, which typically targets common conditions 
and requires significant marketing expenditures, the model for biologic drugs allows for 
adaptability and individualization.46 
¶15  However, biologic drugs are not without flaws. Because biologic drugs are extremely 
structurally complex, replication and mass production pose many challenges.47 The 
extreme precision required to produce a biologic drug determines its development. In other 
words, “the manufacturing process for each biologic defines . . . the product.”48 When 
combined with regulations requiring FDA approval of manufacturing processes and 
facilities—let alone the actual drug—this complexity ensures a significantly more 
expensive creation process than is common for traditional chemical drugs.49 For instance, 
estimates place the cost of creating a manufacturing facility for a new biologic drug, 
excluding materials, between $200 and $400 million.50 Normally taking ten to fifteen 
years,51 bringing a new biologic to market costs an estimated $1.2 billion.52  
¶16  Unsurprisingly, biopharmaceutical firms on average spend roughly 30% of revenue 
on research and development (R&D), amongst the highest of any U.S. industry.53 Some 
biopharmaceutical firms—typically those developing a drug for the first time without prior 
sales to offset costs—spend more than 100% of revenue on R&D.54 Further, with roughly 
75% of R&D funding spent on plans that ultimately fail and only 5%–10% of the drugs 
entering clinical trials receiving approval, most R&D projects provide no remuneration.55 
 
41 JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 1. 
42 See supra note 7. 
43 Stacy Lawrence, Billion Dollar Babies: Biotech Drugs as Blockbusters, 25 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 380, 380 (2007). 
44 See id. 
45 Id. at 382. 
46 See id. at 380.  
47 Kenneth J. Szeto & Marian Wolanski, Initial Steps in the Regulation of Generic Biological Drugs: A 
Comparison of US and Canadian Regimes, 67 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 131, 132 (2012). 
48 SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 8, at 24 (citing Christopher Webster et al., Biologics: Can There Be 
Abbreviated Applications, Generics, or Follow-On Products?, INT’L BIOPHARM MAG. (July 1, 2003), 
available at http://www.biopharm-mag.com/biopharm/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=73785). 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Erwin A. Blackstone & Joseph P. Fuhr, The Future of Competition in the Biologics Market, 31 TEMP. 
J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L 1, 3 (2012). 
52 Henry Grabowski, Genia Long & Richard Mortimer, Implementation of the Biosimilar Pathway: 
Economic and Policy Issues, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 511, 550 (2011). 
53 Blackstone & Fuhr, supra note 51, at 3–4. 
54 Id. 
55 Blackstone & Fuhr, supra note 51, at 4. 
NOR TH WES TERN JO URN AL O F TECH NO LO GY  AND IN TE LLEC TU A L PRO PER TY  2 0 1 5  
 221 
And making matters worse, the FDA has become more cautious than its prior 17%–20% 
approval rate in recent years, 56 sometimes even refusing their advisory panel’s 
recommendations to grant licensure.57 Because of these economic hurdles, the majority of 
biopharmaceutical firms report negative earnings.58 
¶17  Given the extraordinary costs and risks involved in developing biologics, the FDA’s 
increased reluctance to approve new drugs seems perverse. Specifically, these FDA-
exacerbated barriers to entry disproportionately affect small biopharmaceutical firms, 
which are generally far less financially stable than multibillion-dollar corporations like 
Merck.59 Small firms, however, play a critical role in the biopharmaceutical industry. For 
instance, from 2006 to 2008, small firms discovered 50% of all new biologics and 56% of 
“orphan drugs” developed to treat rare diseases.60 But without well-funded coffers, these 
small firms operate with little margin for error, making the degree of risk exponentially 
higher than for established drug makers. This burden, in turn, prompts business mergers to 
mitigate risk, thereby reducing competition and limiting the availability of new products 
available to consumers. 61 Because of these barriers to entry, biologic drug prices are often 
extremely high,62 with many patients spending tens of thousands of dollars annually.63  
B. Overview of the Biologic Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2010 
1. Licensure & Disclosure 
¶18  Congress passed the Biologic Price Competition and Innovation Act as Title VII of 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act to provide a pathway for the licensure of 
follow-on biologic drugs.64 This pathway is analogous to that provided for generic drugs 
by the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, more commonly 
referred to as the Hatch-Waxman Act.65 Hatch-Waxman allowed for the filing of 
Abbreviated New Drug Applications (ANDAs), which have much lower evidentiary 
requirements for approval than traditional New Drug Applications used for pioneering drug 
research. Because ANDAs require only a showing of equivalency with a given reference 
drug rather than independent proof of safety and efficacy,66 the process of bringing a new 
drug to market via an ANDA is consequently much cheaper and less burdensome than 
doing so with a traditional New Drug Application. The ANDA process takes only a few 
 
56 Id. 
57 Id. The authors mention the case of Esbriet, a chemical drug designed to treat idiopathic pulmonary 
fibrosis. Though their advisory panel had advised approval and there was a clear medical need for the drug, 
the FDA refused approval and demanded a new study in early 2010. 
58 Id. at 3–4 (citing Steven Silver, Biotechnology, STANDARD & POOR’S INDUS. SURVEYS (Feb. 24, 
2011), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/49646708/bio-0211). 
59 See id. at 5. 
60 Id.  
61 Id. 
62 Alfred Engelberg, Aaron S. Kesselman & Jerry Avorn, Balancing Innovation, Access and Profits: 
Market Exclusivity for Biologics, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1917, 1918 (2009).  
63 Id. On the extreme end, imiglucerase, a drug sold under the brand names Cerezyme and Genzyme for 
the treatment of Gaucher’s disease, costs roughly $200,000 annually. Id.  
64 Stolberg & Pear, supra note 1, at 1. 
65 JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 1. 
66 Holly Soehnge, The Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act of 1984: Fine-Tuning the 
Balance Between the Interests of Pioneer and Generic Drug Manufacturers, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 51, 54 
(2003). 
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years and costs $1–$2 million by some estimates, resulting in a continuous influx of 
generic-drug manufacturers to the industry.67  
¶19  For biologics regulated under the FDCA, Hatch-Waxman’s 1983 enactment similarly 
provided a generic pathway via the use of ANDAs.68 But prior to the BPCIA’s adoption, 
there was no direct pathway for approval of follow-on biologics under the PHSA.69 And 
because the PHSA regulates the vast majority of biologics, additional legislation was 
needed to form a similar avenue for biologic follow-ons.70 
¶20  Congress passed the BPCIA to bring the regulation of biologic follow-ons in line 
with that for traditional chemical drugs, albeit more than a quarter century later. The 
BPCIA divides follow-on biologics into two categories—interchangeable follow-ons and 
biosimilar follow-ons—based on their relationship to an original, pioneering biologic drug, 
known as a “reference product” for purposes of the statute.71 Interchangeable follow-ons 
are identical to a reference product and can substitute for a reference product under any 
circumstances.72 Biosimilar follow-ons must both be “highly similar to the reference 
product notwithstanding minor differences in chemically inactive components” and have 
“no clinically meaningful differences between the biological product and the reference 
product in terms of safety, purity, and potency of the product.”73 
¶21  To license a product as biosimilar or interchangeable, the application must meet five 
criteria.74 First, the biologic must be substantially similar to the reference product based on 
data derived from (1) analytical chemical studies showing the products are “highly 
similar,” (2) animal studies including toxicity assessments, and (3) “a clinical study or 
studies” sufficient to demonstrate the safety, purity, and potency of the product.75 The use 
of the word “and” without an “or” qualifier suggests that applications must include all three 
types of studies. The statute’s description of the purpose behind each study supports this 
interpretation. There is, however, some ambiguity surrounding the number of studies 
required for each type. The statute states that there may be “a clinical study or studies,” but 
only uses the plural “studies” in reference to animal and analytic studies, which, read 
together, suggests that the application requires multiple animal and analytic studies to gain 
approval. However, regardless of the statue’s text, the elements necessary for an 
application’s approval are subject to the FDA’s broad authority.76 
¶22  The remaining four criteria are less ambiguous, at least textually. To meet the second 
BPCIA requirement, a § 262(k) biologic-license application must show that the 
biosimilar’s mechanism of action mirrors that of the reference product.77 But because these 
mechanisms are often initially unknown, the extent of this requirement is limited to only 
what is identifiable. The third criterion requires the biosimilar and the reference product to 
 
67 Henry G. Grabowski, Patents, Innovation, and Access to New Pharmaceuticals, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 
849, 852 (2002), available at http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org/content/5/4/849.full.pdf+html. 
68 Id. at 8–9. 
69 JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 8. 
70 Id. at 9. 
71 42 U.S.C. § 262 (i)(4) (2012). 
72 Id. § 262(i)(3). 
73 Id. § 262(i)(2). 
74 Id. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i). 
75 Id. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(I). 
76 Id. § 262(k)(2)(A)(ii). 
77 Id. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(II). 
NOR TH WES TERN JO URN AL O F TECH NO LO GY  AND IN TE LLEC TU A L PRO PER TY  2 0 1 5  
 223 
be labeled with the same conditions of use.78 The fourth requires that the biosimilar’s dose, 
route of administration, and strength are the same as that of the reference product.79 Lastly, 
the application must show that the facilities where the biosimilar product is manufactured, 
processed, packed, and held meet standards sufficient to assure that the product is safe, 
pure, and potent.80  
¶23  In addition, the application may include data indicating that it meets the elevated 
requirements for interchangeability.81 Unlike mere biosimilarity, an interchangeability 
designation provides for both an exclusivity period82 and automatic substitution for the 
reference product.83 This requires not only a showing of biosimilarity, but also that the new 
drug can be expected to produce the same clinical result as the reference product.84 
Applicants must also demonstrate that any risks concerning safety or diminished efficacy 
are no greater than that of the reference product.85 Notwithstanding these statutorily 
defined steps, the Secretary of Health and Human Services may nevertheless decide to 
waive any of the elements normally required for a § 262(k) biosimilar-license application 
at any time.86 
¶24  The original reference product receives extensive protection under the BPCIA. For 
instance, while § 262(k) applications can be submitted just four years after the approval of 
the reference product, 87 applications cannot be approved until a minimum of twelve years 
after the licensing of the reference product under § 262(a).88 These rules do not apply, 
however, to licensure for a supplement to the original reference product or to approval of 
modifications made by the original manufacturer concerning dosage, route of 
administration, strength, or biological structure.89 
¶25  The BPCIA also protects the first interchangeable-biosimilar approved.90 Under  
§ 262(k)(6), no subsequent product may be deemed interchangeable until one of four 
possible conditions is met. Namely, if: (1) one year elapses from the first commercial 
marketing of the interchangeable;91 (2) eighteen months pass after the final decision in or 
dismissal of a patent infringement suit to prevent marketing of the interchangeable; (3) 
forty-two months pass after the initiation of an ongoing patent infringement litigation;92 or 
(4) eighteen months pass after the approval of the first interchangeable, assuming no one 
has filed an infringement suit.93 Crucially, the last condition prevents interchangeable 
 
78 Id. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(III). 
79 Id. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(IV). 
80 Id. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(V). 
81 Id. § 262(k)(2)(B). 
82 Id. § 262(k)(6). 
83 Sara Margolis, Note, Destined for Failure? An Analysis of the Biologics Price Competition and 
Innovation Act of 2009, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 209, 227 (2013). 
84 Id. § 262(k)(4)(A). 
85 Id. § 262(k)(4)(B). 
86 Id. § 262(k)(2)(A)(ii). 
87 Id. § 262(k)(7)(B). 
88 Id. § 262(k)(7)(A). 
89 Id. § 262(k)(7)(C). This assumes there is no change to safety, purity, or potency of the reference 
product, which only applies if there is a change to the actual structure, not in the former case where the 
change is to method of use. Id.  
90 Id. § 262(k)(6). 
91 Id. § 262(k)(6)(A). 
92 Id. § 262(k)(6)(C)(i). 
93 Id. § 262(k)(6)(C)(ii). 
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license holders from strategically using their licenses to preclude other companies from 
entering the market.  
¶26  Yet the majority of biopharmaceutical firms are unlikely to find § 262(k)(6) 
particularly useful. Rather than applying to the biosimilar classification, § 262(k)(6)  
exclusively applies to interchangeable follow-ons, which experts anticipate will be an 
incredibly difficult designation to obtain.94 For instance, the FDA could require extensive 
crossover trials, which often deter patient participation, or limit interchangeability 
designations to only those biologics that current technology can be used to demonstrate 
sameness.95 Ultimately, and regardless of the FDA’s eventual process determination, the 
likelihood of § 262(k)(6) having a significant impact seems 
slight.
  
2. Patent Infringement Issues 
¶27  As previously alluded to, the BPCIA provides a complicated system for resolving 
patent disputes between follow-on and reference-product producers.96 The first step, 
known as the patent-exchange step, requires the biosimilar manufacturer and the reference-
product manufacturer to share information.97 After applying for a § 262(k) license, the 
applicant must deliver a copy of the application to the reference-product manufacturer,98 
and, in exchange, the reference-product manufacturer must give the applicant a copy of all 
relevant patents that might be infringed, referred to as a “Paragraph 3 list.”99 If the 
Paragraph 3 list does not include a relevant patent, the reference-drug manufacturer cannot 
later sue for that patent.100 The applicant then submits a rebuttal Paragraph 3 list of its own 
relevant patents, as well as a claim-by-claim analysis of the reference-product 
manufacturer’s list wherein the applicant explains how it is not infringing.101 The last step 
of the information exchange requires the reference-product manufacturer to rebut the 
applicant’s rebuttal, explaining how the patents at issue are indeed likely to be infringed.102 
¶28  Importantly, this information exchange is a completely private interaction between 
the affected parties, subject to strict confidentiality requirements.103 In contrast, the Hatch-
Waxman Act establishes procedures requiring public disclosure of patents, which, in turn, 
are included in the Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, 
referred to as the “Orange Book.”104 But because there are no public disclosure 
 
94 Margolis, supra note 83, at 227. 
95 Id. 
96 42 U.S.C. § 262(l). 
97 Id. § 262(l)(1). 
98 Id. § 262(l)(1)(B)(i); see also Michael P. Dougherty, The New Follow-On-Biologics Law: A Section 
by Section Analysis of the Patent Litigation Provisions in the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation 
Act of 2009, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 231, 234 (2010). 
99 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(3)(A). The name “Paragraph 3 list” is taken from its relevant statutory portion in 
subsection (l). 
100 Id. § 262(l)(7). 
101 Id. § 262(l)(3)(B). 
102 Id. § 262(l)(3)(C). 
103 Id. § 262(l)(1)(C). 
104 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(e) (2009); see Approved Drug Product with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations 
(Orange Book), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/InformationOnDrugs/ 
ucm129662.htm (last updated Jan. 22, 2015). 
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requirements for biologic drugs, no equivalent record exists. This distinction is critical. 
Unlike traditional generic-drug manufacturers, follow-on biologic manufacturers cannot 
determine what patents they might be accidentally infringing in the course of designing 
their products.105 
¶29  Following the patent-exchange step, the BPCIA requires a good-faith negotiation 
over which patents, if any, will be subject to an action for patent infringement.106 If the 
parties are unable to agree, the “Paragraph 5” patent-resolution provisions trigger.107 In 
that case, the applicant must notify the reference-product manufacturer of the number of 
patents it believes might be subject to an infringement suit, thereby setting a ceiling for 
how many patents the reference-product manufacturer may list.108 Within five days of this 
submission, both parties provide a Paragraph 5 list detailing the specific patents each 
believe may be infringed,109 thus forming the basis of the infringement suit. 
¶30  Only after the patent-exchange and patent-resolution processes end can litigation 
begin.110 The reference-product manufacturer can sue for any relevant patents no more than 
thirty days after the parties reach agreement under Paragraph 4,111 or, if the parties were 
unable to agree on a patent list, thirty days after the parties exchanged Paragraph 5 lists.112 
Within thirty days of receiving the complaint, the § 262(k) applicant must notify the office 
of the Secretary of Health and Human Services and provide a copy of the complaint,113 
which the Secretary uses to publish a relevant notice in the Federal Register.114 Unlike the 
Hatch-Waxman Act, there is no provision for an automatic stay of approval once a patent 
litigation is filed.115 
¶31  After this initial litigation process, the applicant must inform the reference-product 
manufacturer 180 days prior to when the applicant intends to begin marketing the 
product,116 which allows the reference-product manufacturer to seek a preliminary 
injunction.117 Importantly, because courts must still determine validity, infringement, and 
enforcement issues for those patents on the Paragraph 3 list not included on the Paragraph 
5 list,118 this notice provision, in essence, ensures that manufacturers maintain the right to 
sue for patents not included on the Paragraph 5 list.119 Similarly, should the applicant fail 
to comply with certain statutory requirements, the reference-product manufacturer may 
seek declaratory judgment for any patent on its Paragraph 3 list at any time.120 
 
105 Charles Davis, Take Two and Call Congress in the Morning: How the Biologics Price Competition 
and Innovation Act May Fail to Prevent Systemic Abuses in the Follow-On Biologic Approval Process, 81 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1255, 1282 (2013). 
106 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(4)(A). 
107 Id. § 262(l)(4)(B). 
108 Id. § 262(l)(5)(A). 
109 Id. §§ 262(l)(5)(B)(i)(I)–(II). Much like with Paragraph 3 lists, the term “Paragraph 5 list” is derived 
from its place in subsection (l). Id.  
110 Id. § 262(l)(6). 
111 Id. § 262(l)(6)(A). 
112 Id. § 262(l)(6)(B). 
113 Id. § 262(l)(6)(C)(i). 
114 Id. § 262(l)(6)(C)(ii). 
115 Davis, supra note 105, at 1277. 
116 Id. § 262(l)(8)(A). 
117 Id. § 262(l)(8)(B). 
118 Id. 
119 Id. § 262(l)(8)(C). Both sides must cooperate with discovery as needed. Id. 
120 Id. § 262(l)(9)(B). The BPCIA imposes punishment for noncompliance during the information- 
exchange process. For example, if the § 262(k) applicant fails to provide its application to the reference-
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III. FORECASTING THE IMPACT OF THE BPCIA ON BIOLOGIC DRUG PRICES 
¶32  Fundamentally, Congress enacted the BPCIA to decrease biologic drugs prices for 
consumers without stifling biotech research and innovation.121  Whether the BPCIA will 
fulfill these goals is unknown. It is simply too soon to tell. But perhaps, comparing the 
BPCIA to the legislation it was modeled after—the Hatch-Waxman Act—provides some 
guidance. Stated simply, the Hatch-Waxman Act has been hugely successful in reducing 
the price of drugs. Generally, the first generic to enter the market costs about 25% less than 
the branded drug, and after multiple generic drugs enter the market, prices often drop up to 
80% from their peak. Because of these decreased prices, more Americans in need have 
access to beneficial medication. As a result, generic drugs now represent roughly 70% of 
total pharmaceutical prescriptions.122 Thus at first blush, it is unsurprising that Congress 
modeled the BPCIA after the Hatch-Waxman Act. 
¶33  But the BPCIA is unlikely to meet these high expectations. Compared to the Hatch-
Waxman Act, various obstacles stand in the way of the BPCIA similarly reducing drug 
prices. First, biologics are inherently more expensive to manufacture, increasing barriers 
to entry and thus reducing competition and its corresponding impact on drug prices. 
Second, the BPCIA imposes long exclusivity periods for both the reference drug and the 
first interchangeable biosimilar, again hindering new firms from competing effectively. 
Lastly, the BPCIA’s interchangeability standards allowing for automatic substitution, the 
primary driver of price reductions, are difficult to meet. 
A. Biosimilar Drugs Are Significantly More Expensive to Develop  
Than Chemical Generics 
¶34  Biopharmaceuticals are inherently more costly to develop than chemical drugs. 
Further, they are difficult to manufacture in quantity, require precise manufacturing 
processes, and involve exorbitant start-up costs, such as the estimated $200 to $400 million 
required just to build the initial manufacturing plant.123As a result, the production of a new 
biologic drug generally requires an investment of approximately $1.2 billion.124 In other 
words, developing a new biopharmaceutical drug costs double the estimated $802 million 
required to develop a new chemical drug.125  
¶35  This cost difference is even greater when comparing biosimilars to generics. For 
instance, in Europe the cost of bringing a biosimilar to market ranges from $75 to $250 
million,126 and requires between eight and ten years to develop.127  On the other hand, 
 
product manufacturer upon completion, it may be sued for declaratory judgment of infringement at any 
time for any patent. Id. § 262(l)(9)(C). 
121 See Epstein, supra note 3, at 286. 
122 Id. at 223. 
123 See SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 8, at 21–22. 
124 Grabowski et al., supra note 52. 
125 SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 8, at 22. 
126 Mark McCamish & Gillian Woollett, Worldwide Experience with Biosimilar Development, 3 MABS 
209, 211 (2011), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3092622/pdf/ 
mabs0302_0209.pdf. 
127 Sumanth Kambhammettu, The European Biosimilars Market: Trends and Key Success Factors, 
SCICASTS (Oct. 27, 2008), http://scicasts.com/specialreports/20-biopharmaceuticals/2152-the-european-
biosimilars-market-trends-and-key-success-factors. 
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standard chemical-drug generics require only a few years and $1 to $2 million to develop, 
a mere fraction of its biologic counterpart.128  
¶36  There are two primary reasons for these high manufacturing costs: scientific 
challenges specific to biologic production and more burdensome data requirements. First, 
it is simply more difficult to make the sort of large molecules characteristic of biologic 
drugs. Virtually every aspect of production must be meticulously controlled and monitored 
to generate a useable product,129 with even minor temperature changes potentially ruining 
an entire batch of biopharmaceuticals.130 The medium of production and storage conditions 
are also essential to the final product.131 Impurities can arise from nearly any change in the 
manufacturing process,132 and because this process takes more time than that for chemical 
drugs, sometimes lasting up to nine months per batch, the likelihood of an impurity 
corrupting the batch increases.133 All of this is without accounting for the costs of materials, 
which are often 20 to 100 times more expensive than for conventional chemical drugs.134 
Perhaps the biggest obstacle, however, is the cost of building, equipping, and qualifying 
the manufacturing plant, which generally costs between $250 million and $1 billion.135 
¶37  On top of the arduous manufacturing process, biosimilars will likely face additional 
data requirements relative to generics. Hatch-Waxman provides very specific data 
standards ANDAs must meet to show bioequivalence, which often suffice to gain FDA 
approval if met.136 The BPCIA, by contrast, only states that the FDA shall require analytic, 
animal, and clinical studies, and provides no further guidance detailing what sort of 
similarity applicants must show.137 Most likely, and lasting for the indefinite future, the 
FDA will determine this amorphous similarity requirement on a case-by-case basis, relying 
only on the relative state of knowledge about the reference product in question.138 
¶38  Given the immense costs associated with entering the biosimilar market, it is likely 
that only well-established companies with substantial extant resources will be able to do 
so at all.139 Even then, as indicated by the FTC, it will likely only be for drugs with annual 
sales greater than $250 million.140 Consequently, only the most profitable biologics are 
likely to face biosimilar competition. In the end, because niche markets and less profitable 
drugs are unlikely to spur the same degree of competition, high prices will remain the norm 
for biologics generally. 
 
128 Grabowski, supra note 67, at 852. 
129 See, e.g., Jordan Paradise, The Devil Is in the Details: Health-Care Reform, Biosimilars, and 
Implementation Challenges for the Food and Drug Administration, 51 JURIMETRICS J. 279, 281 (2011). 
130 See id. 
131 Id. 
132 SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 8, at 24. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 FTC Report, supra note 14, at 14. 
136 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (2012) (“The Secretary may not require that an abbreviated application 
contain information in addition to that required by clauses (i) through (viii).”). 
137 See 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i); see also Grabowski et al., supra note 52, at 518–19. 
138 Grabowski et al., supra note 52, at 519. 
139 FTC Report, supra note 14, at 15. 
140 Id. 
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B. The BPCIA’s Long Exclusivity Periods Will Hamper the  
Emergence of Multiple Biosimilars 
¶39  The BPCIA creates separate exclusivity periods for both the reference product and 
the first interchangeable-biosimilar approved.141 The reference drug receives a firm twelve-
year exclusivity period before the first biosimilar can be approved, including four years of 
data exclusivity in which § 262(k) biosimilar applications cannot be filed.142 The first 
interchangeable, by contrast, receives an exclusivity period ranging from twelve to forty-
two months, depending on the litigation process and marketing strategy employed.143 
Regardless, both impose much higher barriers to entry for new biosimilars than anything 
found under the Hatch-Waxman Act.144  For example, the Hatch-Waxman Act affords a 
five-year exclusivity period for new chemical drugs and a three-year exclusivity period for 
new chemical investigations (NCIs) of small-molecule drugs.145 Those supporting the 
longer exclusivity period for biologics relative to chemical drugs argue that the high costs 
of producing biologics require greater incentives for innovation, thus justifying the more 
restrictive exclusivity provisions.146 Regardless of the reasoning behind these provisions, 
longer exclusivity periods naturally cause prices to remain higher for longer, further 
detracting from the BPCIA’s professed goals.  
¶40  The interchangeable exclusivity period also conflicts with its Hatch-Waxman Act 
counterpart. For a variety of reasons, however, the BPCIA’s exclusivity period might 
actually provide a better catalyst for competition, hastening the entry of additional drugs 
to the market. Hatch-Waxman only provides exclusivity for a period of 180 days following 
an applicant’s first commercial marketing efforts of the generic drug.147 A first applicant 
is defined (somewhat obscurely) as “an applicant that, on the first day on which a 
substantially complete application . . . is submitted [to the FDA] for approval of a drug, 
submits a substantially complete application.”148 In other words, the first person to 
complete an ANDA gets 180 days of exclusivity dating from when she first begins 
marketing.  
¶41  Though the Hatch-Waxman exclusivity period lasts only half as long as even the 
shortest potential exclusivity period under the BPCIA, initial loopholes allowed first 
applicants to game the system by preventing additional generics from entering the 
market.149 Notably, Hatch-Waxman contained no tolling provision on the exclusivity 
period, extending 180 days after first marketing, regardless of when that actually occurred. 
 
141 42 U.S.C. §§ 262(k)(6)–(7). 
142 Id. § 262(k)(7). 
143 Id. § 262(k)(6). 
144 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iv). Hatch-Waxman establishes market exclusivity until 180 days after first 
commercial marketing of the first generic. There are also a number of forfeiture events specified in 21 
U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i) that result in loss of the exclusivity period. These forfeiture events primarily 
revolve around a variety of ways generic manufacturers could potentially prevent the exclusivity period 
from tolling, thus preventing any generics from entering the market. The forfeiture events were added by an 
amendment in 2003 in response to then-rampant abuse of the Hatch-Waxman system. Id. 
145 FTC Report, supra note 14, at 27. 
146 Id. at 25. 
147 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I). 
148 Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II)(bb). 
149 Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003). The Eleventh Circuit 
upheld an agreement between a pioneer manufacturer and the manufacturer of the first generic whereby the 
generic manufacturer agreed not to enter the market for a set period of time in exchange for a large 
payment from the pioneer manufacturer. Id.  
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Though the FDA initially required that generic-drug applicants defend a patent 
infringement claim successfully to be eligible for the 180-day exclusivity period, the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia in Mova Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Shalala 
rejected this interpretation as plainly contrary to the statute as written.150  
¶42  Subsequently, the FDA began implementing the exclusivity provisions purely on a 
first-to-file basis, regardless of any other considerations.151 If the first applicant chose not 
to begin marketing, the 180-day exclusivity period never commenced, thus barring 
approval of any subsequent generics indefinitely.152 Because of this clear congressional 
oversight, first applicants began entering into settlements with pioneer drug companies 
whereby they agreed to refrain from entering the market in exchange for payments from 
the pioneer company.153 Fortunately, Congress responded to these blatantly 
anticompetitive agreements by amending Hatch-Waxman to add a number of forfeiture 
events, which end the exclusivity period if triggered, thus deterring parties from entering 
into these arrangements.154 
¶43  The Hatch-Waxman loophole taught Congress a valuable lesson. Under the BPCIA, 
this type of anticompetitive behavior is impossible. For instance, should the first 
interchangeable choose to accept a payment in exchange for not entering the market, the 
exclusivity period simply runs for eighteen months before terminating.155 While 
technically a party can block other biosimilars from entering the market for up to forty-two 
months, this requires there to be ongoing patent litigation, which inherently precludes the 
sort of reverse payments seen in the original Hatch-Waxman schemes.156 Taking into 
account the exponentially higher costs biosimilar producers need to offset, Congress 
clearly learned from the mistakes it made when drafting Hatch-Waxman, thus providing a 
significantly superior interchangeable exclusivity period under the BPCIA. 
C. Interchangeability Is Unlikely to Be Utilized by the Majority of Biosimilars 
¶44  The FDA will approve an interchangeable designation if an applicant can show that, 
compared to the reference drug, the biosimilar will have the same clinical result in every 
patient and that it is as safe and efficacious.157 This is, naturally, a more difficult 
classification to obtain than mere biosimilarity.158 And while no formal regulations have 
yet been adopted, the FDA released draft guidance for biosimilarity determinations in 
February 2012.159 The FDA’s draft guidance recommends a stepwise methodology 
whereby a potential biosimilar must pass a series of tests to demonstrate biosimilarity, 
 
150 955 F. Supp. 128, 131 (D.D.C. 1997), aff’d, 140 F.3d 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
151 Natalie M. Derzko, The Impact of Recent Reforms of the Hatch-Waxman Scheme on Orange Book 
Strategic Behavior and Pharmaceutical Innovation, 45 IDEA 165, 195 (2005).  
152 Id. at 196. 
153 Id. at 197. 
154 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)–(ii). 
155 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(6)(C)(ii). 
156 Id. § 262(k)(6)(C)(i).  
157 Id. § 262(k)(4).  
158 Margolis, supra note 83, at 227.  
 159 FDA Issues Draft Guidance on Biosimilar Product Development, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 9, 
2012), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm291232.htm. 
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which the FDA will evaluate through applying a risk-based, totality-of-the-evidence 
approach.160 
¶45   But the standards for determining interchangeability are entirely unknown. The FDA 
has yet to issue even draft guidance regarding what will be required to determine that a 
biosimilar is interchangeable, but, judging from the FDA’s own proclamations, the 
standards will likely be rigorous.161 For instance, the FDA may well require biosimilars to 
show “sameness” with the reference product under available tests to qualify as 
interchangeable.162 Alternatively, the FDA could mandate crossover trials, which require 
patients to switch between the reference product and the biosimilar during the course of a 
clinical trial.163 These trials, however, are notoriously burdensome, causing many patients 
to refuse enrollment.164  
¶46  Moreover, the experiences of other countries with analogous biosimilar-
interchangeable regulatory systems further indicate that those seeking interchangeable 
approval are likely facing an uphill battle. In the European Union, for example, the 
European Medicines Agency (EMA), serving in a role comparable to that of the FDA, has 
approved biosimilars of three different categories of biologic drugs, with three more likely 
to follow.165 However, as of 2012, the EMA has not approved a single interchangeable.166 
¶47  The difficulty of obtaining interchangeable status is “likely to dampen how quickly 
a [follow-on biologic] manufacturer gains market share compared to generic drug 
entry.”167 In the traditional chemical-drug market, generic status normally results in 
automatic substitution by pharmacists without physician approval, allowing the generic to 
garner market share quickly at the brand-name drug’s expense.168 And as more generic 
drugs enter the market, the brand-name drug’s market share continues to shrink, prompting 
further competition, all of which ultimately culminates in drastically lower prices for the 
consumer.169 Each element of this chain of events is essential for reduced drug costs.  
¶48  Biosimilars, however, need to qualify as interchangeable to get automatic 
substitution.170 Dramatic price reductions become far less likely without automatic 
 
160 FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS IN DEMONSTRATING BIOSIMILARITY TO A 
REFERENCE PRODUCT 7–8 (2012), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceCompliance 
RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM291128.pdf. The FDA specifically proposes beginning with an 
extensive structural and functional characterization of the proposed biosimilar and the reference product to 
determine what other studies are needed and any potentially important structural differences between the 
two products. Id. From there, the FDA recommends using animal testing to determine toxicity, followed by 
human testing. The totality-of-the-evidence approach is used afterwards to allow for approval in a case 
where the product is shown to have some differences from the reference product that are clinically 
insignificant. Id.  
161 FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BIOSIMILARS: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION OF 
THE BIOLOGICS PRICE COMPETITION AND INNOVATION ACT OF 2009 11–12 (2012), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM27300
1.pdf (stating that the FDA is continuing to consider the information that will enable a determination of 
interchangeability). The FDA also notes that it would be “difficult as a scientific matter” to prove 
interchangeability given the statutory standards. Id.  
162 Grabowski et al., supra note 52, at 519. 
163 Id. at 524. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 520–21. 
166 Blackstone & Fuhr, supra note 51, at 3. 
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substitution. Because obtaining interchangeable status poses such difficulties, biosimilar 
manufacturers will have the additional burden of convincing physicians to prescribe the 
biosimilar in place of the reference drug, requiring significant marketing expenditures.171 
Even with marketing, however, lingering uncertainties about differences between the 
biosimilar and the reference product will likely hamper sales, at least initially.172 Coupled 
with the fear of patients reacting differently to the biosimilar, few incentives exist for 
physicians to prescribe a new drug simply because it is cheaper.173  
¶49  Overall, commentators estimate follow-on biologics will achieve a 10%–30% market 
share.174 Though this will likely decrease biologic drug prices, these slight cost reductions 
will pale in comparison to those resulting from traditional generic-drug market entry, which 
generally capture 80% of the market after introduction.175 Europe’s experience again 
supports these predictions, where biosimilars have caused prices to decrease in the range 
of only 25%–30%.176 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶50  For structural and legislative reasons, the BPCIA will likely fail to facilitate 
biosimilar market entry.177 However, with respect to the long-term health of the 
biopharmaceutical industry, this failure may in fact be a blessing. Biotechnology remains 
one of the riskiest business ventures in the United States, with more than 90% of projects 
failing before reaching the market.178 Even for the few biologics that do eventually make 
it to market, the task of recouping expenses remains daunting: a successful biologic 
typically requires a roughly $1.2 billion investment over the course of 10–15 years.179 If 
society wishes to see further investment in new and innovative biologic drugs, perhaps the 
most important factor is to ensure a sufficiently long period of market exclusivity, allowing 
companies to, at the very least, recoup expenditures.180 Encouraging further biologic 
innovation thus seems prima facie incompatible with rapid biosimilar market entry. 
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